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Abstract  
This paper examines the trajectory of attitudes and policy commitments on the 
environment within the British Conservative prior to and following the 
Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition formed after the election held in May 
2010. The first part addresses the environmental policy of the British Conservative 
Party under the leadership of David Cameron from 2005 to the general election in 
2010. The second examines how Cameron’s environmental commitments were 
translated into practice following the formation of the Conservative/Liberal 
Democrat Coalition in May 2010. The third part characterises and employs the 
idea of ‘politics as usual’ to describe the forces directed against strong 
environmental policies and draws together the themes of the first two parts through 
a consideration of the Coalition’s attitude to airport expansion in the UK.  
Keywords: Environment, Conservative Party, Liberal Democrat Party, United 
Kingdom 
 
Öz 
Bu çalışma İngiliz Muhafazakâr partisi içerisindeki gidişatın durumunu ve 
çevre konusundaki taaddütlerini, Mayıs 2010 seçimlerinden sonra kurulan 
Muhafazakâr/Demokrat koalisyonu öncesindeki ve sonraki dönemde 
incelemektedir. Çalışmanın ilk bölümü David Cameron liderliğindeki İngiliz 
Muhafazakâr Partisi’nin çevre politikalarını 2005 döneminden 2010 genel 
seçimlerine kadar olan dönem içerisinde ele almaktadır. İkinci bölüm Cameron’ın 
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çevresel taaddütlerinin Mayıs 2010’da kurulan Muhafazakâr/Liberal Demokrat 
koalisyonunun sonrasında nasıl pratiğe dönüştürdüğünü incelemektedir. Üçüncü 
kısım birinci ve ikinci kısımda anlatılanları birleştirerek koalisyonun İngiltere’deki 
havaalanlarının genişlemesine karşı olan tutumunu  ‘olağan politika’ kavramı 
üzerinden göstermektedir.  
Anahtar Kelimeler: Çevre, Muhafazakâr Parti, Liberal Demokrat Parti, 
Birleşik Krallık 
 
Introduction: David Cameron, the Conservative Party and the 
Environment 
This paper examines the trajectory of attitudes and policy commitments 
towards the environment within the British Conservative prior to, and subsequent 
to, the Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition formed after the election of May 
2010. Following a consideration of the environmental policy of the Conservative 
Party under the overtly radical and ‘green’ leadership of David Cameron from 
2005 to the general election in 2010, it examines how Cameron’s environmental 
commitments were translated into practice in government. It concludes with a 
characterisation of ‘politics as usual’ which is then employed to analyse the forces 
directed against strong environmental policies and finally draws together its 
leading themes through a consideration of the Coalition’s attitude to airport 
expansion in the UK. The paper is an internal reading of Conservative and 
Coalition environmental politics and policy, exploring its policy, personal and 
power dynamics. Although, clearly, UK environmental policy is constrained and to 
some extent moulded by external policy sources, most notably the European 
Union, space precludes an examination of this. 
A notable feature of David Cameron’s becoming leader of the Conservative 
Party in 2005 was the prominence he gave to the environment. None of Cameron’s 
predecessors had been so environmentally committed as he did, and his leadership 
on the issue even led to arguments over which party was more green (Schlosberg & 
Rinfret, 2008: 257). Cameron certainly established his green credentials early:  
On the very day that Mr Blair publicly doubted the value of a new climate change 
treaty, Mr Cameron put forward … the most radical measures to tackle global warming 
ever proposed by a leading British politician. Then [2005] he was still a leadership 
candidate. When he won, he focused on the issue both in his acceptance speech and in 
his first Prime Minister’s Questions, and … recruited the radical environmentalist Zac 
Goldsmith to help lead a review of Conservative policies. At the same time he 
appointed Peter Ainsworth, probably the most respected green politician in parliament, 
as his Environment spokesperson. (Independent on Sunday, 2006) 
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Cameron had made a good case to be taken seriously as an environmentally 
committed leader. Although at this stage this environmentalism could be seen as 
making easy promises, it nonetheless had measurable effects while they were still 
in opposition. For example, through pressure on the government, in calling for the 
setting of a target for cutting Britain’s carbon emissions by 2050, they prompted 
the introduction of the Climate Change Act (2008) which requires the UK to cut its 
greenhouse gas emissions by 80 per cent (based on 1990 levels) by 2050. This 
implied that future governments will have to meet difficult targets whether or not 
the economy is in recession. The Energy Bill (2008) made provision for the 
introduction of a feed-in tariff for renewable electricity and renewable heat 
incentives. This was inserted into the bill as a result of an amendment tabled by the 
Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties. By leading, promoting and publicising 
the green agenda, and by outflanking the government on the environment, 
Cameron caused the legislation to be more radical than it otherwise would have 
been. 
But this was all in opposition and left untouched the question of how resilient 
or robust the Conservative Party’s environmental commitment would be if they 
formed a government. In 2008 Cameron claimed that his green shoots would not 
wither in the frost of economic hard times: but given the depths of the looming 
recession, was this convincing? In comparable circumstances in the mid-1990s the 
environment moved rapidly down the policy agenda. Further, it was noted that in a 
statement made at the same time about his priorities for government, Cameron 
failed to mention the environment or climate change (Grice, 2008).  
1. Conservatism, the party and the environment  
The Conservative Party under Cameron was highly successful in appealing to 
the green movement. Further, many environmental pressure groups, think tanks 
and activists were favourably impressed not only by Mr Cameron himself, but also 
by his choice of Peter Ainsworth as shadow Environment Secretary. Ainsworth 
was widely regarded as being genuinely engaged with green issues: his credentials 
were impeccable and he lent credibility, commitment and policy weight to 
Cameron’s rhetoric which otherwise might have been more vulnerable to the 
charge of political opportunism. Indeed, Ainsworth was at the centre of the 
Conservatives’ outflanking of the Labour government in the introduction of the 
Climate Change Act. There was also a depth in policy advice. The Quality of Life 
group, led by John Gummer (now Lord Deben) and Zac Goldsmith (now a 
Conservative MP) produced some important and radical policy documents, which 
were taken seriously by the leadership of the party. But other doubts remained. 
One concerned the environmental commitment of other shadow ministers: many 
believed that the shadow Chancellor, George Osborne, or Kenneth Clark (shadow 
Business Secretary) and others, would do all they could to lower environmental 
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expectations and prioritise conventional notions of economic growth. A related 
concern was whether the party’s environmental aims, no matter how genuine, 
could be carried out in the relatively painless way (through ecological 
modernisation) Cameron was committed to. Cameron’s commitment to ecological 
modernisation was evident in one of his early speeches as leader in which he first 
claimed that the Conservatives and the environment had a natural affinity and that 
the Conservative Party had a ‘proud green heritage’ and went on to argue that it 
was false to regard the environment and economic growth as necessarily opposed. 
Green growth would mean ‘harnessing existing and developing technologies in 
energy and transport’, ‘putting a price on carbon emissions and ensuring that the 
polluter pays; and ‘enabling the market to do what it has always done: find the 
most efficient and cost-effective way of doing business’ (Cameron, 2006). 
Many concerns of environmentalists overlap with those of traditional 
conservatism: for example, tradition, continuity, stability, organic change, 
prudence, and appeals to community. It can be argued that there is a deep affinity 
between ecological theory and conservative philosophy, in that both share a multi-
generation perspective, give primacy to the common life, see danger in novelty and 
give a central place to the virtue of prudence. There is scepticism about the 
possibility, inevitability or desirability of ‘progress’ and an emphasis on continuity 
and change as occurring within a developing tradition rather than in the light of a 
‘rational’ blueprint for society (Gray, 1993). 
The difficulty here is that ultimately the claim of a link between the 
Conservative Party and environmentalism rests on an ambiguity between 
conservatism qua disposition and conservatism qua what the Conservative Party 
stood for. But the link between conservation, conservatism and Conservative is not 
a necessary one and therefore the claim that the Conservative Party is committed to 
environmentalism through its name and history is misleading. Further, it is not at 
all clear that the Conservative Party itself will ever accept the full implications of 
stringent environmental policies, which tend to point towards government 
intervention, regulation, and increased taxation. Attitudes within the Conservative 
Party range from climate scepticism and an associated orientation towards 
economic growth which accepts that there is a trade-off between economic growth 
and the environment and chooses the side of economic growth, to those who adopt 
a form of ecological modernisation responding to environmental problems largely 
through traditional means and market based solutions. More radical green voices, 
such as Goldsmith’s, are clear outliers.   
1.1. Environmental Policies, Ecological Modernisation and Challenges  
From where was the Conservatives’ current environmental thinking derived in 
the early years of Cameron’s leadership? John Gummer was Chair of the Quality 
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of Life Policy Group, set up by Cameron in 2005; the Vice-Chair was Zac 
Goldsmith. Its remit was to recommend policies to the Shadow Cabinet; in 2007 
they produced Blueprint for a Green Economy which asserted that ‘Business as 
usual is not a sustainable option … Capitalism is evolving around the world, and 
we believe that the critical next stage is to ensure that it ‘tells the ecological truth’. 
It is in the interest of both rich and poor that we create a model of growth that can 
be sustained’ (Quality of Life Policy Group, 2007: 3). Its recommendations 
included higher taxes on short-haul flights and fuel inefficient cars; a power station 
waste heat levy; a moratorium on airport expansions; and curbs on energy-wasting 
household goods; feed-in tariffs for small-scale low carbon technologies; 
restrictions on energy-wasting stand-by lights; and a cap on energy use by 
domestic appliances. The policy paper Power to the People was published in the 
same year and its themes were endorsed by the policy paper The Low Carbon 
Economy: Security, Stability and Green Growth (2009), published at the precise 
moment the Labour government announced plans to support the building of a third 
runway and a sixth terminal at Heathrow. This enabled the Conservative Party to 
claim the environmental high ground by re-asserting its opposition to expansion. 
The paper stated that the low carbon economy would ‘strengthen our economy. 
Decarbonising Britain will help create hundreds of thousands of jobs … and 
improve Britain’s competitiveness … A decarbonised Britain will be a world 
leader in green technology, engineering, innovation and growth’ (Conservative 
Party, 2009: 3). It included proposals to: transform electricity networks with ‘smart 
grid’ and ‘smart meter’ technology; create a ‘decentralised energy revolution’ 
through ‘feed in tariffs’ for electricity generation to multiply electricity production 
from micro-generation; expand offshore wind and marine power by incentivising 
the National Grid to construct a network of under-sea cables; and introduce 
incentives for electricity network operators to establish a national recharging 
network, leading to the development of electric and plug-in hybrid vehicles (4-5). 
In 2009, Peter Ainsworth introduced the Green Energy Bill in the House of 
Commons: this was a private member’s bill, whose purpose was to take further the 
Climate Change and Energy acts of 2008, and it illustrated his personal 
commitment to environmental action. It sought ‘to trigger government action that 
will pay people for the energy they produce’ and to remove bureaucratic blockages 
in the planning system ‘to make it easier for people to install technologies in their 
homes, businesses and farms that create or save energy’ (Ainsworth, 2009). These 
moves indicated that at least some parts of the Conservative Party were determined 
to push the Labour government on climate change and energy. However, we need 
to consider the extent to which this approach would be, in the longer term, stable, 
sustainable and sufficient.    
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1.2. Challenges and difficulties 
The environment as a policy issue sits on top of some of the key fault lines in 
Conservative Party policy and doctrine. Thus, there has been willingness to use 
markets and create commercial frameworks giving businesses confidence to invest 
in innovation; but green taxes were regarded less favourably and only to be 
considered if they changed behaviour and replaced old taxes rather than added to 
them. This raised the question of whether a Conservative government would 
prioritise environmental ends by adopting non-market, regulatory solutions, or 
limit its environmental policy responses to what could be done within the 
constraints of market-based solutions. Although Cameron himself had a track 
record of environmental commitment, there are other dimensions to the Party’s 
political thinking which constrained the radicalism of any solutions it was prepared 
to accept. For example, Policy Exchange is an important and influential 
Conservative think tank, which takes a strongly business and market orientated 
approach, and is supported by George Osborne among others (Beckett, 2008). At 
various times it has suggested that business should run parts of the welfare state 
and that planning laws should be radically relaxed in favour of developers. It has 
suggested ‘a doubling in size of the current motorway network’ and the lowering 
of fuel and road taxes. These policies are rather more mainstream within the Party 
than Cameron’s. The point, however, is that their policy solutions are, as a matter 
of principle, free market solutions. In so far as the Cameron-led Conservative Party 
adopted the same view there were bound to be severe constraints on any 
environmental policy it would be able to implement.  
An example of the way in which environmental commitments could be 
construed as opportunistic was provided by the discussion over airport expansion. 
The Conservative party declared early that they opposed the third runway at 
Heathrow and re-affirmed their opposition when the Labour government came out 
in its favour. But, it is easier to oppose a third runway than to make cheap flights 
more expensive and Theresa Villiers (then shadow Transport Secretary) did not 
‘rule out airport expansion in the south-east’ (Stratton, 2009). The policy could be 
construed as politically opportunistic, based less on serious environmental 
considerations (climate change), than on narrower more local concerns (noise 
pollution). Again, as part of her statement on Heathrow, Villiers announced plans 
for the next phase of high speed rail (HS2), described as a ‘momentous step 
forward for Britain’s transport infrastructure.’ The proposal is for a high speed rail 
line between London and the north. Villiers claimed that it would benefit 
businesses, heal long-standing divisions in the economy by shrinking the distance 
between north and south, relieve over-crowding on existing lines and help protect 
future generations from climate change (Summers, 2008). These are worthy 
aspirations: but there are inconsistencies at the heart of the Conservatives’ 
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thinking. For example, a true high speed rail link is hugely expensive on fuel 
consumption and associated GHG emissions: competing with air travel generates 
comparable environmental damage. Further, most environmental groups oppose it, 
arguing for upgrading the existing system, and the arguments in its favour are 
typically not environmental, but economic (FOE, 2010). 
1.3. From Opposition to Government 
The easiest way for a mainstream politician to argue that strong green policy 
will not be damaging to their party and the interests of its supporters is to employ 
the notion of ecological modernisation. But, even supposing that this is a viable 
solution, it might still appear too new and speculative to appeal to the party faithful 
and its business backers. A related question was whether the commitment to 
environmentalism could survive the credit crunch and economic recession. It is 
easier to press environmental claims when the economy is buoyant than when in 
recession. Given this, how far could one trust Cameron’s reassurance in a speech in 
2008 that the party’s environmentalism would not be dropped in hard times? In the 
speech he denied that environmentalism was a fair weather policy and that when 
‘the economic going gets tough, the green agenda has to be dropped’. On this view, 
‘protecting the environment is a luxury rather than a necessity – and it’s a luxury 
we just can’t afford in an economic downturn.’ He stated that he wanted this 
generation to be the one which found a way ‘to combine economic, social and 
environmental progress’ and concluded by arguing that ‘it’s not that we can’t 
afford to go green – it’s that we can’t afford not to go green’ (Cameron, 2008). 
However, with the intensification of worries about recession and the economic 
downturn, Cameron had already begun to downplay his concern with the 
environment by the end of 2008: ‘Cameron – having established his reputation 
with the ‘Vote Blue, Go Green’ pledge – seemed scarcely to mention climate 
change any more (Lynas, 2008).
1
   
Thus, leading up to the general election in May 2010, the Conservative Party 
seemed to have a genuine environmental commitment but there was doubt as to its 
depth and tenacity. An incoming Conservative government, whatever its rhetoric, 
would centre its environmental policy on a weak interpretation of sustainable 
development and ecological modernisation, in which its policy-making would be 
largely limited to market-based approaches. 
2. And then came the Coalition 
Three days after the formation of the Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition 
government in May 2010, David Cameron pledged that ‘This will be the greenest 
government ever’. It seemed that the famous slogan ‘Vote Blue, Go Green’, which 
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defined the Conservative Party’s approach in the two or three years leading up to 
the general election of May 2010, was alive and well. However, we are no longer 
dealing with the Conservative Party alone, but with the complexities of a coalition.   
In their joint programme the Coalition made the declaration that ‘the days of 
big government are over; that centralisation and top-down control have proved a 
failure’ (HM Government, 2010: 7). They then stated boldly the potential for 
convention-challenging, radical reform in building a new economy ‘from the 
rubble of the old,’ and to this end they would ‘support sustainable growth and 
enterprise … and promote the green industries that are so essential for our future 
(HM Government, 2010:7). They added that they would avoid governmental 
interference, and change behaviour not through rules and regulations, but in a 
‘smarter’ fashion, ‘finding intelligent ways to encourage, support and enable 
people to make better choices for themselves’ (HM Government, 2010: 7-8). What 
did this add up to in practice?  
In their manifestoes the Conservatives claimed that ‘environmental issues must 
be at the heart of politics’, while the Liberal Democrats claimed that all of their 
policies ‘have a green thread running through them’. They agreed on the need for a 
low-carbon economy, and a key commitment in the Conservative manifesto was to 
establish a Green Investment Bank. The Conservatives wanted 15 per cent of UK 
energy to come from renewable sources by 2020, while the Liberal Democrats 
wanted 40 per cent of electricity to come from renewable sources. They agreed on 
the need for new rules to limit emissions from fossil fuel power stations and to 
develop a smart electricity grid. Nuclear power was more contentious: the Liberal 
Democrats were against it and the Conservatives in favour.  
2.1. The Coalition programme 
Although The Coalition: Our Programme for Government is ‘remarkable for 
the range of green measures it contains – more than on any other topic’, on climate 
change the policy commitments were almost identical with those of the outgoing 
Labour government (Rootes & Carter, 2010: 996). The formation of the coalition, 
Rootes and Carter suggested, provided the opportunity for Cameron to cement the 
modernisation of the Conservative Party and to enact the green rhetoric with which 
he had long been identified. 
The section on Energy and Climate Change stated the need to use a wide range 
of levers ‘to cut carbon emissions, decarbonise the economy and support the 
creation of new green jobs and technologies’. It said that the government would 
‘push for the EU to demonstrate leadership in tackling international climate 
change, including by supporting an increase in the EU emission reduction target to 
30% by 2020’. It also announced that the government would increase the target for 
energy from renewable sources and ‘continue public sector investment in carbon 
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capture and storage (CCS) technology’; and establish a smart grid, smart meters 
and a full system of feed-in tariffs in electricity. And the coalition would ‘create a 
green investment bank’. They also intended to ‘establish an emissions performance 
standard to prevent coal-fired power stations being built unless they are equipped 
with sufficient carbon capture and storage to meet the emissions performance 
standard’, and to cancel the third runway at Heathrow and refuse permissions for 
additional runways at Gatwick and Stansted. On the EU Emissions Trading 
Scheme (ETS) there was a commitment to a floor price for carbon, and to push the 
EU towards full auctioning of ETS permits. And through the ‘Green Deal’, they 
would encourage home energy efficiency improvements; improve energy 
efficiency in businesses and public sector buildings, and ‘reform energy markets to 
deliver security of supply and investment in low carbon energy’ (HM Government, 
2010: 16). They would deliver an offshore electricity grid to support the 
development of a new generation of offshore wind power and encourage 
community-owned renewable energy schemes. Internationally they would ‘work 
towards an ambitious global climate deal that will limit emissions and explore the 
creation of new international sources of funding for the purpose of climate change 
adaptation and mitigation’ (HM Government, 2010: 17).  
On Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, the document proposed the 
introduction of measures to make the import or possession of illegal timber a 
criminal offence; measures to protect wildlife and promote green spaces and 
wildlife corridors; the launch of a national tree planting campaign; increasing local 
accountability in the National Parks; working towards a ‘zero waste’ economy by 
encouraging recycling; creating a presumption in favour of sustainable 
development in the planning system (HM Government, 2010: 18). 
On Transport, there was a commitment to making the transport sector ‘greener 
and more sustainable, with tougher emission standards and support for new 
transport technologies’. This included ‘a national recharging network for electric 
and plug-in hybrid vehicles’ and longer rail franchises to give operators ‘the 
incentive to invest in … better services, better stations, longer trains and better 
rolling stock’. There was also a commitment to reform decision making on the 
prioritisation of transport projects ‘so that the benefits of low carbon proposals 
(including light rail schemes) are fully recognised’ and to the establishment of a 
high speed rail network ‘as part of our programme of measures to fulfil our joint 
ambitions for creating a low carbon economy’ (HM Government, 2010: 31). 
Nuclear power was contentious. The Conservative manifesto committed to 
securing UK energy supplies by ‘clearing the way for new nuclear power stations’, 
provided that they received no public subsidy (Conservative Party, 2010: 92), 
whereas the Liberal Democrats promised to ‘reject a new generation of nuclear 
power stations’, because, ‘based on the evidence nuclear is a far more expensive 
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way of reducing carbon emissions than promoting energy conservation and 
renewable energy’ (Liberal Democrat Party, 2010: 58). However, it was the 
Conservatives’ position that formed the basis of the coalition nuclear policy.  
2.2. The Coalition and the Environment: promise and practice 
The appointment of Chris Huhne as Energy and Climate Change Secretary was 
significant as he had been a longstanding green champion. However, it is important 
also to look at the balance of the ministries and the rift caused by the Coalition 
policy on nuclear power. In addition to Huhne, the other ministers in the 
Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) were Conservatives; at the 
Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra), the all Conservative 
team was led by Secretary of State, Caroline Spelman, by background a lobbyist 
for the food and biotechnology industry. At the Department for Transport, 
Secretary of State Philip Hammond was flanked by two Conservative ministers and 
Liberal Democrat Norman Baker. Out of the twelve ministers in the relevant 
departments, two were Liberal Democrats.  
In addition to tensions between the Conservative and Liberal democrat 
elements of the Coalition, there were marked tensions within the Conservative 
Party. Many Conservative MPs found themselves committed to positions which 
did not sit comfortably with their traditional beliefs and allegiances. Rootes and 
Carter note that: 
the environment might yet prove to be a source of political discontent within the 
Conservative party – and therefore potentially destabilising for the coalition. Before 
the election, there was considerable hostility towards Cameron’s green agenda within 
the Conservative parliamentary party and the wider grassroots membership, often 
expressed in vitriolic language on the party blogs. Climate change, in particular, could 
be a divisive issue. … Conservative candidates in the most winnable seats ranked 
‘reducing Britain’s carbon footprint’ bottom of a list of 19 priorities for the new 
government, and there will be fierce resistance from many Conservatives to any 
measures … that can be perceived as threatening economic recovery or imposing 
unnecessary costs on business. (Rootes & Carter, 2010: 997) 
What has the Coalition done? Briefly, on the minus side it withdrew funding 
for the Sustainable Development Commission (SDC) and announced that it would 
not carry out its proposal to make it an offence to possess illegally felled timber or 
bring it into the country; and it will not extend the subsidy for small-scale solar 
production under the Feed-In Tariff. On the plus side it halted the third runway at 
Heathrow and stated that it would not approve new runways at Gatwick and 
Stansted. A more ambiguous commitment is to HS2: as noted above, HS2’s 
environmental credentials are disputed, there is little evidence that it will take 
traffic off the roads, and Friends of the Earth and other groups argue that upgrading 
the rail system overall would be a better use of resources. In addition, the focus on 
high speed rail deflected attention from the absence in the coalition agreement of 
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policy on road transport and car use. Another missing item was buses, although 
there was talk of encouraging joint working between bus operators and local 
authorities (HM Government, 2010: 31), in practice ‘joint working’ has been a 
victim of expenditure cuts, with more than two-thirds of local authorities planning 
cuts to public transport budgets (Milmo, 2010). Nuclear power has been 
contentious. Although some argue that it is the only way of keeping carbon 
emissions down, it is not clear that the Conservatives support it because of its 
green credentials. As longstanding opponents of nuclear power, the disappearance 
of the Liberal Democrat website ‘No to Nuclear Power’ indicates their 
embarrassment, as does comment from critics such as Adrian Ramsay of the Green 
Party, who asked why the party overcame its opposition to nuclear power and 
approved the construction of eight new nuclear power stations? (Ramsay, 2010).   
 ‘Greenest ever government’? Perhaps not, but how do we judge the claim one 
way or another? For example, on the one hand DECC has taken steps to stimulate 
growth in green energy by allowing councils to sell renewable electricity generated 
on their land, but on the other it has been subject to budget cuts leading to the 
scrapping of funds or scaling down of operations to support offshore wind, 
biomass and geothermal energy. Again, how is cancelling the third runway at 
Heathrow to be measured against the abolition of the Royal Commission on 
Environmental Pollution or the Sustainable Development Commission? And how 
do promises of generating green jobs in a green economy fit the slow progress 
towards developing a Green Investment Bank? 
When the Coalition stopped funding the Sustainable Development Commission 
(SDC), its independent environmental watchdog and advisory body, Jonathon 
Porritt (Chairman 2000–2009) responded angrily, claiming that the ‘justification 
for getting rid of the SDC is transparently vacuous, if not downright dishonest’ and 
‘this is an ideological decision … driven by dogma not by evidence-based, rational 
analysis.’ He asserted that ‘the only conceivable reason for allowing dogma to 
dominate in this way is that the government doesn’t want anyone independently 
auditing its performance on sustainable development – let alone a properly-
resourced, indisputably expert body operating as ‘a critical friend’ on an inside 
track within government’. Secretary of State for the Environment, Caroline 
Spelman, argued that the matter was too important to be devolved to an outside 
body. Given this background, was the Coalition seriously prepared to address the 
issue of whether the economy was developing along inherently unsustainable 
lines? (Black, 2010). 
The government offered four justifications for axing the SDC, the first that it 
would save money: the irony was that half its funding came from Defra and half 
from the devolved administrations and other Whitehall Departments, which all 
wanted to carry on working with the SDC. The second was that sustainable 
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development was mainstreamed across government by being embedded in every 
department, the inference being that ‘no specialist capability at the centre is any 
longer required, simply because the government “gets it”’. Porritt regarded this as 
absurd. He then observed that the SDC was a UK-wide body, and that Wales and 
Scotland, who have done better than Whitehall in ‘mainstreaming’ sustainable 
development, were not in favour of abolition. The only reason to which Porritt 
gave any credence was eliminating duplication: the SDC, because it carried out a 
variety of tasks, was bound to overlap with other bodies; however, it was virtually 
the only input ministers regularly received from the standpoint of integrated 
sustainable development. Further, it was the only body which worked with other 
public sector bodies in offering advice on sustainable development and provided 
independent scrutiny of government performance across the whole sustainable 
development agenda. The final justification was that sustainable development was 
too important to delegate to an external body. Here Porritt reminded us of 
Spelman’s words, in which she cast the decision as a matter of principle and 
personal responsibility ‘I am determined to take the lead role in driving the 
sustainable agenda across the whole of government, and I’m not willing to delegate 
this responsibility to an external body’. He commented that ‘even after nine years 
working with dozens of government ministers, I’m astonished at such utterly 
brazen cynicism.’ He also pointed out that the only thing Spelman had so far done 
as Secretary of State was to publish a new departmental strategy containing no 
serious reference to sustainable development. Hence his conclusion that the 
justification for closing the SDC was vacuous, dishonest and dogmatic. Although it 
was too early to make a definitive judgement about the Coalition’s green agenda, 
the prospects were not encouraging, because ‘“Greenest ever” has to mean 
something substantive. Simply smearing a sickly ideological slime over everything 
just won’t cut it’ (Porritt, 2010).  
2.3. The Green Investment Bank  
In October 2010 the Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR) was published. 
Many of its proposed cuts hit hard at environmental spending. Defra’s budget was 
cut by 30 per cent (compared with a government average of 19 per cent); DECC 
was cut by 18 per cent; the Environment Agency lost 5,000-8,000 of 30,000 jobs; 
Natural England’s budget was cut by 30 per cent (800 full-time jobs). The Review 
also included proposals to sell off national nature reserves, privatise parts of the 
Forestry Commission and sell off the Meteorological Office. The former proposals 
proved to be extremely unpopular and led to widespread campaigning against 
‘selling off our woodlands’. Rather less has been heard of the latter, but concerns 
have been expressed that privatisation would undermine the position of an 
organisation which has contributed greatly to public understanding of climate 
change. 
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Another example of a less than full commitment to the environment was the 
story of the Green Investment Bank (GIB).
2
 The statement in the Coalition 
Programme that ‘we will create a green investment bank’ (HM Government, 2010: 
16) was interesting for what it omitted: the level of funding. Everything, however, 
depends on this: it is the difference between tokenism and a seriously committed 
contribution to a green economy. The status, remit and funding of the GIB has 
been the subject of much political battling between ministers and departments 
since the formation of the coalition. The fighting was not necessarily between the 
coalition parties: typically it was between ministers in their ministerial roles. The 
CSR included a commitment to the GIB, but with a start-up figure of £1bn against 
the originally anticipated £2bn; it is generally reckoned to need £4-6bn to make 
any significant impact. Chris Huhne, and the climate change minister, Greg Barker, 
took the lead in negotiations with the Treasury supported by the Minister of State 
for Policy, Oliver Letwin, and the Business Secretary, Vince Cable. The Treasury 
continued to oppose it, proposing instead a repackaging of existing green pledges 
in a new fund, but Cameron promised that the GIB would be a proper bank 
(Murray, 2010) and Huhne openly attacked the Treasury. The matter was resolved 
in December 2010 with the Treasury victorious: the GIB would begin life as a fund 
– which would jeopardise the provision of billions of pounds of loans to green 
technology. Huhne conceded prioritising the deficit over the GIB, leading to the 
claim that he was ‘forced humiliatingly into repudiating his principles, saying that 
sustainability must not take precedence over cutting the deficit’ (Ballard, 2010). 
However, without Huhne’s advocacy, the GIB might never have come into being at 
all. It was formally established in 2012, is still acting as a fund, and will have full 
borrowing powers from 2015.  
As suggested above, it is always difficult to push strong environmental policy 
during a recession, especially within a government committed to deficit reduction 
through cuts in public expenditure. Of course, much depends on whether the cuts 
are motivated by ideology or necessity. This is why Huhne’s commitment to the 
GIB found itself so uncomfortably caught between neo-liberal ideology and the 
coalition’s professed environmentalism. Again, although the coalition argued in its 
own policy documents that many environmental policies lead to green growth and 
employment, their commitment has in practice been weak. The result is that very 
few any longer seriously claim that the Coalition is the ‘greenest ever government’; 
on the contrary, the UK seems to have reverted to ‘politics as usual’? 
3. ‘Politics as Usual’ 
What is ‘politics as usual’? It is the adoption of certain standard approaches to 
the economy, economic growth, and the protection of economic and political 
                                                          
2See Connelly, 2011, for a full account. 
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interests, together with scepticism concerning the environment, especially where it 
is felt to be a brake on growth and profitability. This does not necessarily imply 
active hostility to the environment, but it does imply relative indifference. ‘Politics 
as usual’ has a structure consisting in a set of deep presuppositions, together with 
an associated lexical ordering between levels of presuppositions and commitments, 
the structuring effects of power and influence, and the limits of bureaucratic 
rationality. On this view, the actions of government are an expression of 
underlying structures of power and influence, basic beliefs and administrative 
stasis. Mid-way between observable action and deep presuppositions lie 
approaches to tactics and strategy, the manipulation and structuring of choices, and 
the shaping of the political opportunity structure.  
An important aspect is power. Following Lukes, at the deepest level (the third 
dimension), there is the power of unacknowledged action-guiding presuppositions 
which are non-observable, unquestioned and rarely challenged. At the next level 
(second dimension) there is the ability to shape and manipulate agendas of public 
debate through reputational power, or the implicit threat arising from the belief that 
political actors can access other forms of power if they wish. Finally, there is 
explicit observable power (first dimension). Power operates on all three 
dimensions simultaneously, they are not mutually exclusive, they overlap, and they 
differ in efficiency. For instance, it is more efficient to employ reputational power 
to manipulate the political agenda than to rely on explicit threats or physical force; 
and where the political agenda is founded on deep naturalised presuppositions 
ensuring prior agreement on fundamental ends that is more efficient still (Lukes, 
2005).
3
  
For example, a political actor, if believed to be powerful, can rely on reputation 
and implicit threat to achieve success in agenda manipulation. Further, their power 
draws additional nourishment from the underlying set of presuppositions which 
absolves them of the need to argue their case explicitly because it is always already 
the default position. Only challengers to the status quo have to seriously argue their 
case whereas its defenders rarely need to provide more than a minimal level of 
argument. Thus defenders of the political and economic status quo possess an 
inbuilt advantage either because no one questions the desirability of economic 
growth (as an end), or of roads, planes, trade and industry (as means); or, if these 
are questioned, the questioning is superficial, with the challenger typically 
presumed to be ‘sentimental’ and ‘unrealistic’. In this world, to be real is to be 
measurable, whatever is not measurable is not real, and the approved medium of 
measurement is GDP. In such ‘debates’ a conclusion is swiftly reached that 
                                                          
3This account is indebted to Lukes, 2005. The term ‘naturalised’ refers to beliefs so much taken for 
granted that they are believed to be the natural order of things.  
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although hypothetical cases might exist where economic considerations are not 
paramount, in practice unlimited economic growth is an unqualified good. All that 
then remains of the policy debate is discussion of means, location or timing: when 
or where, rather than whether; more or less, rather than not at all; and hence 
opportunities for manipulation of decisions through constrained choices open up 
nicely.   
‘Politics as usual’, then, concerns a set of presuppositions within which it is 
possible to distinguish deep presuppositions (taken for granted in all political and 
economic argument) from surface presuppositions which are relatively open to 
question. Surface presuppositions typically (but not invariably) concern means 
rather than ends; deep presuppositions tend to concern ends, not means. Relations 
between these presuppositions are governed by a lexical order with certain 
conditions having to be satisfied before others come into play. For ‘politics as 
usual’, once the conditions for ensuring economic growth are satisfied, 
environmental considerations can come into play, but not vice versa. Therefore, if 
environmental protection is at the expense of economic growth it should not be 
pursued; if it promotes economic growth it should be pursued; if it has no palpable 
effect on economic growth it might be pursued if desired.  
Debates surrounding, for example, transport, rail, roads and aviation policy take 
place within this framework, where two of the presuppositions of ‘politics as usual’ 
are the desirability of economic growth and belief that the relationship between 
environment and economy is usually a trade-off. The second presupposition is 
slightly more subtle than this, in that environment and economy are not necessarily 
taken to clash, but where they do (and they usually will), economy should be 
prioritised. Both might co-exist in a green economy pursuing sustainable green 
development, but the implicit proviso is that this so only while there is no 
opposition between them. It is also worth noting that ‘green growth’, ‘green 
economy’ etc are typically promoted not as green qua green, but as good for the 
economy per se: 
 
again, environmental values are subordinated to economic values.  
‘Politics as usual’ rests on other presuppositions too, including attitudes to the 
scope and limits of governmental action, taxation, property and rights,. For 
example, let us consider attitudes to the scope and limits of governmental action. In 
2007 the political editor of the Daily Express, Macer Hall, remarked that Zac 
Goldsmith sought to remove the ethical dimension, which he characterised as the 
exercise of free choice, from daily household decisions, and claimed that ‘Tories of 
his ilk seem to have stolen from socialism the idea that the tax system should be 
used to change human behaviour rather than being a necessary evil for funding 
essentials such as defence and policing’ (Hall, 2007). Hall is right that the point of 
green taxation is to change behaviour and his view therefore amounts to banning 
green taxes on the grounds that the proper role of government does not include 
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behaviour modification through taxation. This presupposition covers means, and 
where such presuppositions operate, certain means are regarded as impermissible 
irrespective of ends.
4
  
Policy making tends to be conducted incrementally, in accordance with 
bounded rationality. Disjointed incrementalism is both descriptive and prescriptive. 
It describes both how things happen and prescribes a model for rational decision 
making in complex societies. In the issue attention cycle, environmental issues wax 
and wane in public and political consciousness; when they return to active policy 
consideration, they already have an institutionalised footing. They become 
institutionally embedded and operate within the bounds of the structural 
presuppositions of bureaucracies as an entrenched dimension of their policy 
making activity. Institutionalisation, in the form of appropriate agencies and 
departments, possesses the advantage of providing a ready-made structure within 
which policy responses can be channelled. However, this has another side, because 
along with inherited techniques for dealing with issues, problems tend to be 
defined in ways which only allow solutions in accord with prevailing political and 
administrative arrangements. Douglas Torgerson argues that there are limits to the 
‘administrative mind’ (2005). This means that policy makers typically pay 
attention only to problems which are amenable to technological and administrative 
solutions. Modern ‘rational’ administration presupposes a vision of order and 
progress within which certain approaches or responses are regarded as reasonable 
or rational and others are not and within this frame, environmental problems are 
often responded to atomistically rather than holistically because to appreciate them 
as interconnected would constitute a challenge to our underlying views of 
economic development. The administrative mind cannot admit that there might be 
a fundamental flaw in the whole pattern of industrial development. 
Environmentalism mounts a challenge to the administrative mind because it 
implies that ‘progress’ may be a source of disorder, ‘disrupting the natural systems 
upon which civilization and human life depend’ (2005: 105). The administrative 
mind thus denigrates those who articulate a different vision. Problems cannot be 
admitted to be systemic crises but have to be presented in a way which presents 
manageable, soluble and more or less separable problems so as to match the 
‘functional differentiation of the administrative apparatus’ (2005:106). 
Fragmentation of issues into different government departments leads to the 
overlooking of the interconnected nature of environmental problems. Doubtless 
there is something to be said for reframing problems to admit of practicable 
solutions and it would be absurd to dismiss the importance of incrementalism, 
bounded rationality, and the constraints of the administrative mind. But taking 
                                                          
4Some might regard the ends as undesirable too; thus certain means are impermissible both because they 
are means to improper ends, and also because they are improper means to any ends. 
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environmentalism seriously present a serious challenge to those limits and the 
presuppositions which sustain them.   
3.1. Virtù and fortuna in environmental politics 
An important part of ‘politics as usual’ was characterised by Machiavelli as the 
interplay of fortuna and virtù. The relation between fortuna and virtù is the 
interplay between chance and abilities within the political opportunities 
experienced by political actors. For Machiavelli, the term virtuoso (derived from 
virtù) refers to the personal qualities the prince should acquire. The interplay of 
virtù and fortuna is ineliminable. A virtuoso politician holding a position can 
achieve great things; the post is a necessary for greatness, but not sufficient; virtù, 
the ability to grasp what fortuna offers, is necessary too.  
An example of virtù. Upon being appointed Secretary of State for Energy and 
Climate Change in May 2010, Chris Huhne was seen as pivotal to the success of 
the government’s environmental policy. In the political jungle he was a ‘big beast’; 
although the Chancellor of the Exchequer is, ex officio, one of the biggest beasts, 
Huhne was a sufficiently powerful virtuoso to harry the Chancellor and the 
Treasury in the discussions leading to the formation of the GIB. He did not fully 
succeed, but success is relative. He was also a forceful negotiator in international 
climate change negotiations.
5
 However, fortuna decreed that he would be forced to 
resign in February 2012. His successor, Edward Davey (another Liberal Democrat) 
is regarded as both less green and less virtuoso. Liberal Democrats generally do not 
lead the large and powerful departments and therefore have to be possessed of 
extraordinary virtù to be able to challenge the Treasury and the other powerful 
ministries. They have to achieve greatness rather than have greatness thrust upon 
them.  
An example of fortuna. Before 2010, the Conservative MP Justine Greening 
was an eloquent opponent of a third runway at Heathrow Airport. Although her 
opposition might be for predominantly local reasons (her constituency lies under 
the flight path), her stance dovetailed with the Conservative Party’s objections to 
Labour’s plans for airport expansion. Hence the symbolism of her becoming 
Secretary of State for Transport in October 2010 was important; equally, her 
removal in September 2012 was seen as that symbolism’s mirror image. Her 
replacement was Patrick McLoughlin, who is in favour of airport expansion. 
Greening’s deputy at the Department for Transport, Theresa Villiers, was opposed 
to expansion of Heathrow and to Boris Johnson’s proposal for a new airport on the 
Isle of Grain in the Thames estuary (‘Boris Island’), and in favour both of HS2 and 
                                                          
5Greenpeace UK Director, John Sauven, responded to the news that Huhne would remain throughout 
the 2010 Cancun climate change negotiations by saying that, with ‘the outcome hanging in the balance’, 
he had a vital role to play in helping to ‘broker a climate deal’ (BBC News, 2010). 
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freeing capacity at Heathrow through increased use of Manchester and other 
northern airports. 
Leadership is a complex topic: key variables include power or its lack and 
scope of action or its lack. Powerful actors, such as the Treasury, can dominate 
without needing to persuade; the relatively powerless, on the other hand, can (and 
have to) lead through skill in negotiating or facilitating agreements, or in 
redefining and conceptualising the terms of debate. Transport or environment 
ministers are likely to be relatively powerless and hence to rely on entrepreneurial 
or cognitive leadership. How far they can succeed depends largely on a confluence 
of circumstances, although their leadership style is likely to be humdrum, not 
heroic or transactional, not transformational.
6
 In the longer term cognitive 
leadership can lead to significant change and to that extent ‘politics as usual’ can 
be subverted; but in the short term, the hegemony of powerful actors will tend to 
dominate.  
When Greening left transport, it was reported that there was rejoicing in the 
aviation industry, while elsewhere there was condemnation and suspicion. Boris 
Johnson stated that ‘there can be only one reason to move her – and that is to 
expand Heathrow’ and that ‘we will fight this all the way … If we are to remain 
Europe's premier business hub we need a new four-runway airport, preferably to 
the east of London, that addresses the problem of aviation capacity before it is too 
late, and business is driven into the arms of our European competitors’ (BBC 
News, 2012). Although Johnson is opposed to Heathrow expansion he is not 
opposed to airport expansion as such. For Goldsmith, Greening’s original 
appointment to Transport had shown the Prime Minister’s position on Heathrow to 
be solid and yielding so easily to pressure for her replacement indicated ‘panic, not 
principle’, while Friends of the Earth claimed that she had been ‘shunted out’ and 
was a ‘victim of intense aviation lobbying over airport expansion (BBC News, 
2012). Meanwhile at Defra, Spelman was replaced by Owen Paterson, a climate 
change sceptic largely indifferent to environmental concerns (Carrington, 2012; 
Monbiot 2012). Prior to this he had formulated a plan for economic growth in 
which the key elements were exempting micro businesses from red tape, ending 
energy subsidies, rapid exploitation of shale gas, and ‘urgent review of airport 
policy to ensure Britain gets its full share of global trade’ (ConservativeHome 
2012). A government which was the ‘greenest ever’ would not have appointed him. 
The precise difference these personnel changes will make is unclear: but powerful 
environmental voices who might have challenged ‘politics as usual’ have lost 
influence. And David Cameron himself is now largely silent on the environment, 
                                                          
6For more on styles and types of leadership, see Wurzel & Connelly (2011), 13. 
 MARMARA JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN STUDIES                                                          19 
having yielded to the consolidated forces of economic orthodoxy and re-embraced 
‘politics as usual’.  
3.2. Airport Expansion: an ever decreasing circle 
Since 2010 chance and circumstance have combined in a move towards a third 
Heathrow runway. The argument, essentially, is that airport expansion was bound 
to happen and ‘Boris Island’ was essentially a decoy, whose value lay in its 
deflecting attention from whether expansion was desirable to where it should be. 
Once Boris Island is rejected, the only serious remaining option will be expansion 
of Heathrow. In 2012 government officials had indicated that the prospect of 
building a third runway at Heathrow was ‘dead and buried’ and that they would 
consider ‘all ideas bar a third runway’; ‘then we also had a Transport Secretary … 
who lived under the flight path and had campaigned against the plan. What a 
difference to today, when a third runway at the UK’s biggest and busiest airport is 
very much back on the table’ (Westcott, 2013). Final decisions have yet to be 
taken, but it appears to be a perfect example of the reassertion of ‘politics as usual’, 
with growth to the fore, the tactic of a constrained choice between an evil and a 
slightly lesser evil, and some ersatz environmental concern: Boris Island would be 
environmentally destructive and is therefore opposed by environmental groups. 
Voila! Heathrow is the least worst environmental option. This political 
manoeuvring demonstrates the power and virtù of the Chancellor and his allies. 
Osborne has progressively revealed his support for more runway capacity in the 
south-east and for Heathrow as the only practicable solution, although still 
claiming that all options should be open. Read: a) all options (except not increasing 
capacity) are open, and although all options are ‘open’, some are more open than 
others. What is palpably absent is any systematic discussion of aviation in relation 
to transport or environmental policy as a whole.   
We are nearing the end game. Although the government claims that its position 
against airport expansion remains unchanged, the appointment of the Airports 
Commission, under Sir Howard Davies, suggests otherwise. In November 2012, 
the Secretary of State for Transport, Patrick McLoughlin, announced its terms of 
reference (McLoughlin, 2010). It was required to report by the end of 2013 on the 
nature, scale and timing of the steps needed to maintain the UK’s global hub status 
and its recommendation for actions to improve the use of existing runway capacity 
in the next 5 years; and to report no later than summer 2015 on options for the 
UK’s international connectivity needs (including economic, social and 
environmental impact). McLoughlin remarked that ‘Aviation is vital to the UK 
economy and we need to have a long term aviation policy which meets the 
challenges of the future.’ The presupposition is that there will be an increase in 
airport capacity and debate has been reduced to the future location and expansion 
of aviation. Given that the next general election will be held in May 2015, the 
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timescale is politically expedient, allowing the government to uphold the letter of 
the coalition agreement which ruled out airport expansion in the current 
parliament.
7
  
The Airports Commission issued its interim report in December 2013 and 
recommended that London will need another runway by 2030. It shortlisted only 
Heathrow and Gatwick for expansion. Surprisingly, it included a proposal to 
extend Heathrow's existing northerly runway westwards to allow takeoffs and 
landings from the same runway at the same time. Patrick McLoughlin did not 
comment on the shortlisted options, nor guarantee that the Conservatives would 
support the commission’s final verdict. The commission will examine the three 
proposals and recommend one in 2015; further studies will be made of a Thames 
Estuary airport (Boris Island) which might be added to the shortlist, however ‘the 
logistical challenges are very severe’. The London Mayor’s alternative of 
expanding Stansted, was rejected along with more than fifty other schemes 
(Calder, 2013a).  
In an accompanying political analysis, Nigel Calder commented that ‘Sir 
Howard Davies has tight-rope walked the line between Cameron and Boris over 
airport expansion’, and that:  
The UK’s role in global aviation has long been subservient to local politics in west and 
south-west London. One purpose of the Davies Commission was to elevate the debate 
above political squabbles. But airport expansion has become a proxy for the rivalry at 
the heart of the Conservative Party between the Prime Minister and the Mayor of 
London. Ruling out all Thames Estuary options at this stage would have fuelled that 
political battle rather than allowing the Airports Commission diligently to evaluate each 
of the three short-listed options. Sir Howard has bought some time by looking at the 
theoretical consequences for the environment and economic geography of an Isle of 
Grain development, while simultaneously focusing on his three preferred options 
(Calder, 2013b). 
The interim report of the Airports Commission indicates the extent to which the 
Coalition has ceased asking serious questions about environmental policy in the 
round. Instead the debate has been reduced to one about timing and location 
mediated by factional politics within the Conservative Party.  
Conclusion 
Overall, since 2010 the Coalition government has moved decisively away from 
its loudly proclaimed green commitments, through a phase of relative silence, to a 
reassertion of traditional values. The most recent indication includes Cameron’s 
speech discussing the need to challenge the EU’s powers to dictate areas of 
environmental policy. He claimed that there were areas, including environmental 
                                                          
7Decision making on airport expansion is an example of Lukes’s second dimension of power. 
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legislation, ‘where Europe has gone far too far.’ He was not specific on details, but 
close observers think that the Conservative Party would, while continuing to accept 
the EU carbon emissions reduction target, oppose the setting of a separate 
renewables target; that they would act on Osborne’s long established complaints 
about the ‘ridiculous cost’ the Habitats and Birds Directives places on UK 
businesses (despite a Defra investigation showing the falsity of this claim); and that 
they would seek to make changes to the Air Quality Directive (ENDS, 2013).  
Despite appearances, ‘politics as usual’ never really ceased to operate. And 
certainly, for its advocates, ‘politics as usual’ is neatly in its rightful place. The 
Treasury reigns supreme; radical, green and powerful ministers prepared or able to 
challenge the Treasury have resigned or been sidelined and replaced with weaker 
or hostile ministers; public opinion is indifferent and believes the claims of green 
government to be bogus; the deep lying assumption that economic growth is 
paramount is triumphant. Gestures are made to green growth, sustainable 
development, and to the politics of ecological modernisation, but in any clash with 
the prevailing economic view they are put firmly in their place.  
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